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
RESEARCH REPORT

U. S. FORCES IN EUROPE: MAINTAIN OR REDUCE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID CHASE

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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U. S. FORCES IN EUROPE: MAINTAIN OR REDUCE

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Mr. Bruce Morland

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: U.S. Forces in Europe: Maintain or Reduce? AUTHOR:
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The author comments on the development of NATO and how the Alliance has responded to the threat over the past forty years. A comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces offers the reader some insight into the relative capabilities of both sides including both conventional and nuclear forces. The author discusses the political and economic factors as they relate to force levels and the consequences that any reductions in U.S. force levels might forebode. Recommendations for dealing with the current realities of determining force levels for NATO are provided.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lt Col David L. Chase is currently assigned as a student at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama. Lt Col Chase was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1969 from the University of New Hampshire. He has completed Squadron Officers' School, Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and holds a masters degree in Education from the University of Maine. Lt Col Chase has served in various staff and command assignments in Air Training Command; the United States Air Force Academy; the Pentagon; and at Headquarters, United States European Command. His most recent assignment before attending Air War College was as Deputy Commander, 50th Combat Support Group, Hahn AB, West Germany. Lt Col Chase is married to the former Linda Adams of Portsmouth, N.H. and they have two children, Mark and Glenn.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Second World War inaugurated a new era in U.S.-European relations. The Soviet Union was transformed from an ally into an adversary as Communist rule was extended to countries of the Eastern bloc. While U.S. forces were demobilizing, the Soviet military presence on the continent remained strong. Europeans gradually became wary of Soviet intentions and began taking measures to ensure their own security. The political and economic turmoil in Europe between 1945 and 1949 gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (1:107) For more than forty years, NATO has been credited with preserving the peace in Europe as well as promoting social and economic bonds among its members. (1:113)

The U.S. has provided forces in support of NATO from its very inception. Over the years, this substantial presence has been the subject of a continuing debate about the role of U.S. forces in Europe and whether all member nations are bearing their fair share of the defense burden. With the rapidly changing events now occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the debate is raging stronger than ever as pressure builds on the Bush administration to begin

immediate withdrawals of U.S. troops.

The results of a recent poll indicate that 60 percent of Americans want reductions in defense expenditures. (2:4) A key question being asked is why does the U.S. remain in Europe so long after World War II? (3:19&46) The question is particularly relevant in light of Secretary Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions in Soviet forces.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of U.S. forces in Europe to determine if a reduced presence on the continent would serve U.S. and allied interests. This paper will address three key elements of the issue:

1. What is the threat?
2. How much defense is needed?
3. How fast should reductions be made, if any reductions should be made at all?

As part of the analysis, this paper will focus on the key political, economic, and military issues bearing on the problem and provide recommendations for changing or reducing U.S. forces in support of NATO. It is not the intent of this paper to recommend how an arms agreement should be structured or how it should be implemented.

CHAPTER II

THE U. S. and NATO

Before analyzing the threat, it might be worthwhile to consider why the U.S. has military forces committed to Europe. In essence, it's because of U.S. obligations as a member of the NATO alliance. NATO emerged from the rubble of WWII approximately forty years ago. The Alliance was formed in response to a growing Soviet menace on the continent. As the war drew to a close, it became increasingly apparent that a post-war struggle between two opposing camps was being set in motion with the U.S. on the one hand and the Soviets on the other. The struggle has continued throughout the post-war period manifesting itself in various forms. To this day, the disparity between the forces of the Eastern block and NATO has been a continuing source of instability on the continent. (4:16-19)

Under the terms of the treaty (Article 5), member nations, including the U.S., agree that 'an attack against one or more of them...shall be considered an attack against them all....' (5:14) The treaty further states that each member will develop their capacity, individually and collectively, to resist armed attack. (5:13) The treaty itself makes no mention of specific kinds of forces to be provided by each nation. These force structures are

determined through consultations involving each of the members and spelled out at least to a limited degree in Status of Forces agreements.

From the beginning, the U.S. has been a major contributor to the Alliance providing both conventional and nuclear forces in support of NATO's deterrent strategy. When President Truman first committed troops to NATO, he believed they would be needed only temporarily. (6:205) Throughout its history, the U.S. has refrained from becoming involved in 'entangling alliances.' In this case, however, it was not envisioned that the 'cold war' would turn into a protracted struggle requiring a continued U.S. presence.

The number of forces committed to NATO has varied over the years depending on various political, economic, and military considerations. The U.S. contributes land, naval, and air forces which can engage the enemy at any level on the spectrum of conflict from low-intensity conventional operations to general nuclear war. Presently, the U.S. has stationed approximately 320,000 troops in Europe and there may be as many as one million Americans in Europe in support of the defense effort. The Pentagon estimates the cost of supporting the NATO allies at between 160-170 billion dollars per year. This estimate represents approximately 60 percent of the U.S. defense budget. (6:205)

NATO, with its U.S. presence and nuclear umbrella has preserved the peace in Europe for more than forty years--the

longest period without conflict in the last in three centuries of European history . This is a remarkable accomplishment given the nature and scope of the Soviet threat. However, times are changing and so is the perception of the threat.

With 'Gorbymania' sweeping across Europe, there is a growing sense that peace has broken out and that the threat is slowly evaporating. Indeed, the remarkable events that are taking place within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that Communism is on the decline. These events portend significant implications for U.S. forces on the continent and elsewhere. At the heart of the debate is the question--should U.S. forces be maintained or reduced?

In the next chapter, we will begin answering that question by looking at the threat now posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

CHAPTER III

A DECLINING THREAT?

The issue of force levels must first and foremost be linked to the nature and scope of the threat. A threat assessment is provided annually by the Intelligence community. It is the basis upon which policy decisions are made concerning the structuring of the Nation's armed forces. Information describing the threat is often sensitive and, therefore, protected under the appropriate security classifications. However, for purposes of this paper, it will be sufficient to draw upon intelligence data that is readily available from open sources.

For ease of comparison, it has been customary for analysts to compare forces of NATO with those of its rival--the Warsaw Pact, formally known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization. (7:111) A summary of the forces which could be employed by both sides is portrayed in Appendices 1-3. (8:13, 14, 16, 17)

This comparison clearly shows what has been common knowledge for some time: the Warsaw Pact enjoys a commanding advantage in terms of its conventional and nuclear capability across the spectrum of forces including tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, ships, and military personnel. What has troubled military planners over the

years is the fact that the Warsaw Pact's forces greatly exceed that which would be required purely for defensive purposes. (9:17)

In view of recent events in East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, it may no longer be appropriate to view the threat from the traditional NATO/ Warsaw Pact perspective. Even before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of democratic reforms in Eastern Europe, some observers considered the Eastern European countries to be reluctant Warsaw Pact partners at best. (10:21) As this paper is being written, a growing number of observers believe the possibility of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is indeed very unlikely. (11:11) At the very least, the Warsaw Pact can no longer be considered the cohesive military force it once was. (12:8)

In the words of one distinguished writer:

"... The possibility of nuclear war, in my judgment, between the Soviet Union and the United States today is very, very remote. I could not have made this statement as recently as five years ago. Today, I make it without reservation. Problems will not be resolved in the nuclear arena, but in the economic and diplomatic arenas." (12:12)

Another writer has commented, "General Secretary Gorbachev has radically altered the political atmosphere and removed the once very real threat that Soviet forces might unleash a surprise attack on the West." (13:4)

But can we assume on the basis of such statements that the danger is gone? I think not. The fact remains that the Soviets continue to be NATO's most formidable adversary. In the words of Secretary Baker, "We compete militarily because we differ politically. Political disputes are fuel for the fire for arms competitions." (14:11) Furthermore, the inherent contradictions between Communism and Capitalism which spawned the 'cold war' have not changed. The Soviets continue to cling to Communism as the only acceptable social system. As long as their ideology remains unchanged, the potential for conflict between East and West continues to exist. (15:81-90) Therefore, despite signs of an apparent thaw in political relations between East and West, we must continue to base our assessments on actual capabilities. (9:17)

The two alliances, NATO and Warsaw Pact, have served as a stabilizing influence since the end of WWII. However, the new direction being taken by the Eastern bloc could lead to significant instability in the region. The type of nationalism that is emerging today in the East is not altogether different from the nationalism that gave rise to WWI. (16:4) Other forces are also at work which could further contribute to instability in the region. These forces include the extremely poor economic performance of Eastern European countries, their heavy debt load, the lack of democratic government skills, and generally old ethnic

rivalries. Instability in Eastern Europe poses as great a threat to the USSR as it does to Western Europe.

If change occurs too rapidly, it is difficult to predict with any certainty how the Soviet Union might react. For example, how would they respond to a united Germany and its membership in NATO? That's why we must keep Soviet military capability in mind when considering U.S. troop reductions. It is far easier to assess the Soviet's military capabilities than it is to predict their intentions.

In summary, the threat that we are seeing today has taken a different form, but militarily it has not diminished to any great extent. As former Navy Secretary Lehman has stated, we don't yet know if the changes we are seeing represent 'tactical retreat or strategic change.' (17:30) Perhaps this issue was best summed up in the following excerpt from a leading magazine:

"...The revolutions of 1848 were crushed--by Russian troops, as it happens. The same could conceivably happen again, post Gorbachev, or in some incarnation of Gorbachev II. "Our freedom is an illusion," said Gyula Obersovszky, a veteran of 1956, in Budapest, 'until Moscow becomes free.' We're not there yet." (18:12)

Until we know what is happening inside the Soviet Union, our defense establishment must continue to address Soviet military capabilities.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET CAPABILITIES: FACT OR FICTION?

The military capabilities of the Soviet Union are stronger today than they have ever been. A look at several key elements of their force structure will reveal why. First, their forces overshadow not only U.S. forces, but also exceed the combined strength of NATO. (19:123) Second, Soviet troop reductions to date represent only a small fraction of their overall capability. Additionally, these reductions are in areas where the Soviet advantage is greatest or where force reductions would have the least impact. (20:1) Third, plans to reduce military spending by 14.2 percent have not yet materialized. According to a CIA/DIA report, Soviet military spending rose by three percent after inflation in 1988 with emphasis on procurement of new weapon systems, a level of growth consistent with previous years. (21:6) Since Soviet spending policies are highly inflexible, it could be until the next 5 year plan before we could see any changes in Soviet military spending.

In other respects, Soviet military capabilities continue to be impressive. For example, the Soviets are producing annually more than 3500 tanks, 750 new aircraft, and thousands of artillery pieces. In addition, the Soviet navy acquires a new submarine every thirty-seven days,

making the Soviet fleet twice that of NATO's 350 vessels.

(22:13) (23:4)

In the strategic arena, the Soviets have begun deploying the Mod V variant of their SS-18 heavy ICBM. According to one source:

"The Mod V is the third new ICBM the Soviets have introduced since General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985. Also deployed on his watch have been the rail mobile SS-24 and the road-mobile SS-25. In the past year alone, twenty SS-24s and sixty-five SS-25s have entered service." (24:8)

Additionally, it can be argued that the treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) has further aggravated the long-standing conventional imbalance between the two sides. (25:108) In the aftermath of the treaty, NATO now finds itself with fewer options in the event that aggression occurs and it must rely more heavily on short-range nuclear missiles if its conventional forces cannot withstand an attack. On the other hand, the Soviets have succeeded in eliminating an important nuclear threat to their homeland while reducing NATO's capability for nuclear escalation. (26:71) By the same token, a major nuclear threat to Europe and other regions of the world also has been eliminated.

Another striking characteristic of the Soviet force structure is the fact that, despite their claims to the

contrary, Soviet forces are mainly geared for offensive operations. (27:preface) (9:1) In addition, Soviet forces are still forward based in the Warsaw Pact countries although the Soviets have withdrawn the equivalent of a tank army from Eastern Europe. (28:15A) However, these withdrawals may be less significant than they might first appear. This is because the troops and equipment have not been disbanded as Mr. Gorbachev had stated would be the case. On the contrary, the tanks and their personnel have simply been reassigned to other units. The infrastructure of these units remains intact (24:8) and, hence, their ability to mobilize and deploy if the need arises.

The above point is further supported by evidence contained in Soviet military doctrine and other military writings. This is noteworthy because doctrine is often the basis upon which a country's military forces are structured and trained. Additionally, military doctrine provides a strong indication of how an enemy's forces would be employed in combat. When Soviet doctrine is examined, two themes become apparent.

First, the Soviets subscribe to the theory 'reasonable sufficiency', a relatively new concept in their lexicon, which is intended to suggest that the Soviets would no longer seek superiority in numbers. In actuality, 'reasonable sufficiency' is defined as a level which "rules out superiority by the forces of imperialism." (26:71) In

my view, this new terminology does not represent a significant departure from previous policies. Since the end of WWII, the Soviets have relied on superiority in order to offset other advantages or perceived advantages held by the West. Today, even in light of Gorbachev's force reductions, the Soviets retain a clear advantage in almost all hardware categories and they are making every effort to achieve qualitative superiority as well. (29:238) (30:291)

The second theme, however, does represent a significant change or so it would appear. Soviet writings, including doctrine, now talk of the possibility that a war in Europe could be fought for a protracted period and be conducted with conventional weapons only. (26:71) (31:94) In other words, the Soviets believe a European conflict would not necessarily trigger a nuclear conflict with the United States. This view poses an interesting problem for NATO planners because it brings into question the strategy of 'flexible response' and U.S. resolve in its commitment to Europe's defense. This is not the first time that such issues have been called into question. (32:265) If the Soviets subscribe to this theory, NATO's nuclear deterrent may not be as credible as it once was.

In summary, it is clear that the Soviets continue to maintain an awesome military capability both in the conventional and strategic arenas. They are continuously modernizing their forces and, despite serious economic

problems, are still spending a disproportionately high percentage of their budget on defense. Although Mr. Gorbachev has created much goodwill in the West, many observers remain skeptical of Soviet intentions and are not yet willing to concede any major changes in the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. (33:7) While this large Soviet arsenal does not in and of itself represent aggressive intent, one must wonder why they continue to maintain such a large offensive capability if they have no intentions of using it. (29:223)

In the words of one writer:

"Without unequivocal evidence of irreversible political change in the Soviet Union, this [Air Force] Association believes that the nation must attend to Soviet capabilities." (34:6)

The next question to be addressed is how the Alliance and the U.S. in particular should deal with the current threat and Soviet capabilities. In other words, can U.S. forces be reduced without creating further instability in the region? ¹

CHAPTER V

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

There are no ready answers to the question posed in the title of this chapter. In the past, NATO's force levels have been determined through negotiation and agreement among its members. Contrary to popular opinion, these force levels have not been based on technical calculations or empirical studies. (35:86) There are simply no clear cut guidelines on what forces are necessary to achieve deterrence. What constitutes sufficiency on one hand is often seen as insufficient on the other depending on how one views the threat. Consequently, NATO has had difficulty achieving a consensus among its members on what forces are sufficient and how much each member should contribute to the defense of Western Europe. However, despite their occasional bickering, NATO members agree that deterrence is still the preferred strategy. It's how to achieve deterrence that causes problems for the Alliance.

In order to have a credible deterrent force, two elements must be present-- capability and resolve. In other words, the enemy must believe that you have the forces to inflict unacceptable damage on his territory and that you have the resolve to use those forces to keep him from achieving his objectives. (30:292) Stated another way,

capability is meaningless if there is no intention of using it. The problem with deterrence is determining how much and what types of forces are required. (36:13) Most observers agree that NATO must be able to withstand an initial attack and hold its positions long enough to mobilize national forces and to receive reinforcements from overseas. (36:14) Can conventional forces alone achieve that objective? Are nuclear forces required? If so, how much is required? Because deterrence is such a nebulous concept, there are no easy answers to these questions. According to Admiral Trost, the concept of sufficiency is largely a matter of opinion. (30)

Influencing this opinion are other factors in the political process such as budgetary considerations. With mounting concern over the deficit, the issue of how much is enough is rapidly becoming one of how much will it cost. Historically, Congressional funding for military programs has consistently fallen short of Pentagon budget requests. This means that over the years, the Services have had fewer resources in terms of military equipment, hardware, and people than it felt was necessary to meet U.S. strategic objectives. The difference between what was requested and what was actually funded constituted the 'risk' that the Nation was willing to accept at the time.

Political-sociological realities within the European community are also influencing decision makers on the issue

of U.S. force levels. These realities are increasingly bringing more pressure to bear on the U.S. political system to reduce its overseas presence. (3:19&46) There is little doubt that pressure is building within Europe for a reduced U.S. presence. According to one recent survey, 51 percent of Europeans polled reject the use of U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the defense of Western Europe and 79 percent want all nukes removed from the continent. (37:4) Some European officials have already gone on record suggesting that the U.S. presence be reduced. (38:1)

Furthermore, a groundswell of public opinion is creating other problems for NATO. To begin with, there is growing opposition to low-level flying, night flying, and ground maneuvers. Most flying training must be conducted during daylight hours because of German flying restrictions. In addition, low-level flying time has been reduced by about 45 percent in low-level flying areas. (39:26) NATO is no longer able to conduct training operations as it feels it should. These restrictions on training could have a negative impact on readiness and, in at least one case, are hampering NATO's efforts to upgrade its fighters with a new system for night operations.

The upgrade of the F16 with the new low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared system for night (LANTIRN) is now in jeopardy because of public apprehension among West Germans. It has been reported that the Air Force is now

reconsidering its decision to deploy the LANTIRN system on F15E/F16 aircraft stationed in Europe because of the current political and military situation. (39:26) It is becoming increasingly clear that considerations other than military efficacy are driving decisions on the types of forces to be deployed within the theater.

In the past, the U.S. and NATO have accepted a certain amount of 'risk' in part because it was felt that we maintained a technological edge over the Soviets which compensated for their superiority in men and equipment. However, in recent years this technological gap between the two superpowers has been shrinking. (40:53) For example, one report suggested that the Soviets are clearly superior to the U.S. in some areas of technological development including submarines. (41) Although still the technological leader, the U.S. no longer enjoys the substantial advantage in terms of technology that it once did.

Not only are Soviet forces improved from a technological standpoint, but also the Soviets enjoy advantages in terms of logistics and sustainability. (42:70) For example, they require a shorter logistics tail that is less vulnerable to attack than NATO's pipeline. In time of crisis, the U.S. must maintain the capability to ferry men and materiel across the Atlantic to sustain the war effort. The Soviets don't. This requirement drives our force structure because we need the ships and aircraft to deliver

combat power to the battlefield and to support our forward deployment strategy. (29:73) Compounding this problem is the need to protect these assets enroute to the combat zone and upon arrival to their assigned units within the theater of operations.

We learned several years ago during Exercise Salty Demo just how vulnerable our airfields and aircraft were to Soviet attack; no one knew before the exercise just how vulnerable they were. As a result of the exercise, several notable deficiencies were revealed. A modest attack by Soviet aircraft essentially brought the air base to a grinding halt for almost two days while engineers worked to restore the airfields. The base's aircraft were rendered impotent during this time. Likewise, there were many more 'casualties' than anticipated. Disruptions to above ground fuel lines and electrical connections complicated base recovery and made it more difficult for commanders to resume combat operations. (43:63)

In summary, the forces needed for deterrence cannot be easily quantified. Some would argue that current levels represent the minimum forces required for peace in Europe. Others argue that the U.S. presence need not be as large as it is now. Since precise force requirements cannot be determined, the size of the U.S. contingent is basically a matter of opinion. This opinion is being shaped by economic and political-sociological considerations within the theater

and in the U. S.

Public opinion seems to be concerned more with perceived reductions in the threat rather than actual Soviet capabilities. With declining support for defense spending, military requirements will be driven less by what is needed and more by what is deemed affordable and supportable. In the past, NATO relied on superior technology to compensate for enemy superiority in numbers. Today, however, the technological gap is narrowing while pressure is mounting to reduce military training and military forces in theater. If these trends continue, and they likely will for the foreseeable future, the implications for NATO are significant as we shall see in the next chapter. Although NATO does not need to match the Soviets one for one, it still needs to maintain a credible deterrent.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

If we reflect back to the early days of NATO, we recall that U.S. conventional forces were outnumbered substantially by Soviet forces just as they are today. But this asymmetry was of little consequence then because U.S. forces were only meant to be a 'trip wire'. If those forces failed to repel an attack, a U.S. general nuclear strike could be triggered. (44:100) Through its reliance on a strategy of 'massive retaliation', NATO recognized little need for a strong conventional capability. (45:185) However, during the Kennedy administration, a policy shift resulted in the formulation of a new strategy called flexible response. This strategy, which NATO adopted in 1967, had enormous implications for U.S. force levels. (46:189-205) It meant that NATO was now concerned about both the quality and quantity of its conventional forces. As a result, efforts were undertaken to upgrade and modernize these forces.

Under flexible response, an attack on NATO would be met with the forces necessary to repel the attacker and restore the status quo. If NATO's conventional forces were overrun, NATO would retaliate with nuclear weapons until the conflict could be terminated on terms favorable to NATO. In theory, nuclear weapons would only be used if NATO's

objectives could not be achieved at a lower level of conflict. With this strategy, it was thought that NATO's deterrent capability would be more credible than massive retaliation and that it would give policy makers options that were not limited solely to the employment of nuclear weapons. (47:10) In turn, this would theoretically raise the nuclear threshold and increase stability in the region. As we consider reductions or changes in the U.S. presence, we must consider what impact, if any, force reductions might have on NATO's strategy.

This question is particularly relevant in light of the recent agreement on INF forces which some have argued has already begun to erode the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture. (48:1) If the U.S. and NATO continue to draw down their forces, the potential exists that the concept of flexible response will become increasingly less flexible. There are already some indications that NATO is returning to the 'trip wire' strategy of the early 50s. (44:100)

Evidence of this apparent turnabout came as a result of the agreement on INF forces which resulted in the destruction of all intermediate nuclear weapons on both sides. Within the theater, NATO was left with only its short-range nukes which will become obsolete in the mid-90's. Few observers consider these weapons a viable option in the event conventional forces cannot withstand an attack. As a result, the modernization of short-range nuclear forces

has sparked a heated debate within the Alliance with the U.S. on one side and Germany on the other. (49:6)

Considering the potential ramifications for Germany, it is unlikely that the missiles will be replaced with a more modern system. (37:4) (44:100) If short-range weapons are not replaced and conventional forces are reduced, NATO could be right back where it started--almost totally reliant on the strategic nuclear option for deterrence.

In a recent column appearing in Air Force Magazine, Gen. T.R. Milton (Ret.) wrote:

"... So NATO is right where it has always been, dependent on the credibility of the US strategic arsenal, the US forces in Europe an avowal of that credibility. It is, in a much more elaborate way, reminiscent of Georges Clemenceau's answer to an earnest British emissary who, in the early days of World War I, asked what the French leader wanted from England. One British soldier, answered Clemenceau, who will be an immediate casualty."
(44:100)

Before the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, it would be prudent for policy makers to consider the strategic ramifications of such a move. Once these forces are withdrawn, it will be difficult to mobilize and redeploy them in a timely manner in the event of a crisis.

From my perspective, there are at least two inherent dangers in drawing down the U.S. presence too quickly based on existing capabilities of the enemy. First, any reductions would alter the balance of power in Europe to

NATO's disadvantage. We must remember that the continent is still fraught with uncertainty. If Gorbachev's reforms are unsuccessful, the Soviet Union may react in ways that we cannot contemplate at this time. We must be prepared for any eventuality. Although the likelihood of conflict is low, their capability remains exceedingly strong. If this power gets out of control, the interests of NATO and the U.S. could be placed at considerable risk. We should not abandon what has worked so effectively for the past forty years. As stated by a former high ranking defense department official, "The case against radical surgery on U.S. forces continues to be strong. The U.S. is still vulnerable to attack and regional conflicts can get out of hand." (50:11) I would add that Eastern Europe could get out of hand if changes occur too quickly.

Another reason mitigating against withdrawal of U.S. troops at this time concerns arms negotiations. Currently, both sides are engaged in serious arms reductions talks. These talks are significant for many reasons, not the least of which is the real potential for achieving deep cuts in the Soviet arsenal. For the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, NATO has an opportunity to reduce the huge advantage in conventional forces which the Soviets have maintained all these many years. NATO could use these talks to reduce imbalances in conventional and nuclear forces without investing significant amounts in new hardware. This

is not a pipedream; it is reality. We should take advantage of the opportunity that is before us. (51:92)

It should also be noted that other NATO countries will not likely agree to fill any void created by the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The fact of the matter is that the same political-sociological factors influencing U.S. force levels are affecting our allies as well. The U.S. has long complained that other NATO nations were not carrying their fair share of the defense burden. In one case, a NATO nation does not allow nuclear weapons on its territory during peacetime. (52:14) Additionally, at least ten NATO countries have failed to achieve even their stated conventional defense improvements and in another, the air force has a pilot-aircraft ratio which is approximately one-to-one. (51:92) Much of what the U.S. does vis- a-vis NATO is contingent on the actions of the Europeans in meeting their fair share of the common defense. If they don't hold up their end of the bargain, the U.S. is not likely to take up the slack. (53:28)

In summary, conditions are changing and so will the composition of NATO's forces. It seems clear that practical considerations will override any concerns for the strategic and intangible implications that any U.S. force reductions might have on the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture. For this reason, it is apparent that the question is no longer should we reduce, but how should we do it. The U.S.

must be careful not to allow domestic political pressures to reduce defense to undermine on-going arms negotiations with the USSR.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

During the past several months, sweeping changes have occurred within the Soviet bloc that are rapidly changing the political landscape of Eastern Europe. Pressure is mounting both in Europe and the U.S. to reduce the U.S. presence on the continent. There is a growing perception that 'peace is breaking out' and that a strong military force is no longer needed to protect the security of the West.

Although the likelihood of conflict may be lower than it has been since NATO was formed, the Soviet military is still the most powerful threat to the U.S and NATO. While relations between both sides are cordial, the political climate could change if the hard-liners return to power. NATO must remain strong in order to deal effectively with any eventuality. Unfortunately, decisions on U.S. force levels will likely be based on political and economic factors more than security considerations. These factors could have a tremendous impact on NATO's ability to respond to a crisis.


In view of all of these considerations, I recommend that the U.S. adopt the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. should not proceed with unilateral reductions of its forces in Europe. If U.S. forces are reduced in strength, those reductions should be made from CONUS units.
2. No reductions of U.S. forces should be considered without weighing the impact of such reductions on NATO's flexible response strategy and the ability of the Alliance to regenerate those forces in the event of a crisis.
3. In arms negotiations, the U.S. should insist on Soviet reductions that will result in a more balanced force structure between the two sides. The U.S. should take credit in any future arms agreement for force reductions made between now and the time an arms agreement is signed.
4. NATO should continue to modernize its strategic and conventional forces. Upgrading of the Lance short-range missile system is a must to help add more flexibility to NATO's defensive doctrine.

APPENDIX I


COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT LAND FORCES IN EUROPE MANPOWER AT TOTAL STRENGTH



APPENDIX II


COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT TANK FORCES IN EUROPE - 1970 AND 1987

(IN ACTIVE UNITS WITHOUT DEPOT RESERVES)



COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT ARTILLERY IN EUROPE - 1970 AND 1987

(IN ACTIVE UNITS WITHOUT DEPOT RESERVES)




APPENDIX III

NATO - WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFT QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS

SELECTED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE
(EXCLUDING MOSCOW AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT
AND NAVAL AVIATION)

Total Numbers in Europe:




* A large proportion of interceptor aircraft can be used in ground-attack roles

NATO — WARSAW PACT Combat Aircraft in place in Europe

	Fighter Bombers	Interceptors	Reconnaissance	Bombers
NATO	2,245	1,115	340	0
WARSAW PACT	2,380	4,145	580	360*

* This figure does not include about 300 bombers of Naval Aviation: the M-4 BISON and Tu-95 BEAR strategic bombers, support aircraft such as tankers or those aircraft used for command and control or electronic warfare.

1983 AND 1986 COMPARISONS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND MOBILE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (IN PLACE IN EUROPE)



* Including 1,000 launchers for the S-300 missile system, which is not included in the NATO figures.

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